KENJI TAKAHASHI
Toyo University takahashi049@toyo.jp
THE THEORY OF DREAM AND SLEEP IN THE VĀRṢṆEYĀDHYĀTMA (MAHĀBHĀRATA 12,203–210)
In the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma section of the Mahābhārata, dreams are regarded as something that binds practitioners to the cycle of transmigration. Therefore, it is taught that practitioners should renounce sleep altogether in order to avoid dreaming. To the best of my knowledge, while there are texts in ancient Indian traditions that treat dreams and sleep negatively, there are no others that completely prohibit sleep. This study clarifies the structure of the theory of dreams and sleep through a close reading of the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma, and examines its position in intellectual history by comparing it with earlier Upaniṣadic texts and contemporary medical literature. There appear to be two main reasons why this doctrine prohibits dreaming. The first is that cognition (vijñāna) is lost during dreams. The second is that one becomes overwhelmed by rajas and tamas, thereby reproducing transmigration. In this doctrine, dreams are said to arise from the latter two, rajas and tamas. The process is described as follows: the manas (mind) re-experiences, in dreams and without the aid of the sense organs, the impressions formed during waking life. Living beings experience various dispositions according to the proportions of sattva, rajas, and tamas assigned to them by the creator deity; likewise, in dreams, impressions corresponding to these proportions arise, ultimately reproducing these qualities. When this doctrine is compared with Upaniṣads and medical texts, we find that the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma is based on the philosophical and psychological reflections on dreaming current at the time, while also incorporating a critique—particularly of Upaniṣadic teachings on dreams. The idea that dreams consist of impressions from waking experience is found in the Upaniṣads, while the notion that sattva, rajas, and tamas influence dreams appears in medical literature. However, the Upaniṣads often describe deep sleep as a state in which the true self experiences bliss, and dreams are frequently portrayed positively as a state in which the self freely enjoys various objects. For example, in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (2,1.17ff.), it is said that the self apprehends bodily functions in dreams. In contrast, the present doctrine asserts that cognition (vijñāna) itself is lost in dreams, along with memory, suggesting a critique of the Upaniṣadic view. On the other hand, the Chāndogyopaniṣad (8,7ff.) includes passages that deny the value of dreams and sleep, noting that dreams may involve unpleasant experiences and that in deep sleep the sense of self is lost. The theory of dreams and sleep presented here can thus be understood as an extension of such philosophical developments, integrating Sāṃkhya thought and ideas from medical literature.